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I.    INTRODUCTION1 
A systematic failure of lawyers to produce competent briefs is threatening 
the heart of the legal profession.  As the law develops, the number of 
lawsuits—particularly appeals cases—grows.  In response, there is wide-
spread concern for judicial economy, zealous advocacy, and the health of 
the law.  Such concerns fashion a necessity for better briefs.2  
 
1. “[T]hink of one point, above all, that you want the court to remember from your brief—and 
then put it in that first sentence.”  Raymond M. Kethledge, A Judge Lays Down the Law on Writing 
Appellate Briefs, GPSOLO, Sept./Oct. 2015, at 25, 27. 
2. “Words are the tools of a lawyer’s trade.”  Carol McCrehan Parker, Writing Throughout the 
Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and How to Achieve It, 76 NEB. L. REV. 561, 562 n.2 (1997) (“[W]ords 
are of central importance to the lawyer because they are, in a very particular way, the tools of his trade.” 
(quoting Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L. Q. REV. 71, 71 (1946))).  See Sarah B. Duncan, 
Pursuing Quality: Writing a Helpful Brief, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1093, 1095 (1999) (emphasizing the significant 
effect brief writing has on the durability of precedent and quality of judicial decisions (quoting JOHN 
W. COOLEY, CALLAGHAN’S APPELLATE ADVOCACY MANUAL § 1.03, at 7 (1989))).  A careful use of 
words helps a lawyer illustrate her arguments and present them to the court.  She does this within a 
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II.    QUESTIONS PRESENTED3 
A. Whether a duty to write better briefs exists within the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules);4 
B. Whether, in light of current standards, an ethical duty should 
additionally be adopted imposing stricter brief writing requirements; and 
C. In the absence of controlling authority, how do we define the scope 
of an ethical obligation for better brief writing? 
III.    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT5 
Writing is central and imperative to the legal profession.  Yet, briefs 
frequently breach ethical duties and go unpunished.  Current standards 
focus heavily on procedural aspects of brief writing.  This is not enough.   
Imposing an additional ethical standard for briefs will enhance the quality 
of legal writing and benefit the justice system as a whole.  A more uniform 
standard will help to fulfill goals of the Model Rules by increasing the 
effectiveness and value of legal services, while simultaneously alleviating 
judges and litigants from arduous appellate practices. 
Because competency is a requirement in all aspects of legal practice, 
competency in brief writing is a necessary component to the practice of law.  
Therefore, a lawyer’s duty to produce better briefs is an ethical necessity. 
 
written brief, and thus, brief writing has a central significance to the legal profession.  See Hodge v. 
McGowan, 50 V.I. 296, 316 (2008) (per curiam) (noting the confusing and vague quality of the party’s 
argument, and how it discounted the party’s credibility at trial); Duncan, supra, at 1094–95 (garnering 
the filing of an unhelpful brief akin to “failing the judicial system as a whole”).  If “the eyes may be 
windows to the soul,” then the pen may be the heart of the law.  State v. Magett, 850 N.W.2d 42, 58 
(Wis. 2013) (citing ALEXIS TADIÉ, STERNE’S WHIMSICAL THEATRES OF LANGUAGE: ORALITY, 
GESTURE, LITERACY 50 (2003)).  Truthfully, I struggled to use a quote as my own choice words, for 
whimsical quotes, while perhaps eye-catching—or at least entertaining—are not always an effective use 
of space.  This is particularly true in legal writing, where space, or—more importantly—the reader’s 
patience and time is limited.  See Duncan, supra, at 1094 (“If you are not communicating, you are wasting 
your time.” (quoting Mark Rust, Mistakes to Avoid on Appeal, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1998, at 79)).  But cf. Peter 
Friedman, Book Review: Bryan A. Garner, The Winning Brief (Oxford University Press 1999), 2 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 219, 219 (2000) (“I hate quotations.  Tell me what you know.” (quoting 11 RALPH WALDO 
EMERSON, THE JOURNALS AND MISCELLANEOUS NOTEBOOKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 110 
(A. W. Plumstead et al. eds., 1975))). 
3. “You want to state the issue fairly, to be sure, but also in a way that supports your theory of 
the case.  A well-framed issue statement suggests the outcome you desire.”  ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 83 (2008). 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
5. “Treat your summary of argument like the precious asset it is.”  Kethledge, supra note 1, at 25, 
27; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 97–98 (“State the main lines of thought without 
embellishment, omit quotations, and cite only key cases (if any at all).”). 
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A pattern of three key qualities—organization, compression, and 
revision—are centrally tied to a lawyer’s brief writing duties.  When focusing 
on these factors, a lawyer helps to improve the quality of her briefs, the 
quality of legal precedent, and the current state of legal writing. 
IV.    PROCEEDINGS BELOW: CURRENT BRIEF WRITING STANDARDS6 
There are, of course, current brief writing guidelines.  To provide 
structural criteria for briefs, courts implement both procedural and 
substantive rules.7  Such rules make it easier to decipher the parties’ 
arguments, which helps judges to render accurately informed decisions and 
opinions.8 
Courts adopt rules like these with the purpose of preventing 
inadequacies.9  Some courts post sample briefs to their websites to help 
 
6. “Your goal at this stage isn’t to argue, but to tell the court how the issues before it arose 
procedurally and how the case got here.”  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 93. 
7. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 28 (declaring, as a minimum, arguments in briefs should contain 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on—which is a procedural 
requirement), with Coe v. Coe, 788 S.E.2d 261, 267 (Va. Ct. App. 2016) (advancing substantive 
guidelines, demanding that “an appellant’s opening brief contain [t]he principles of the law, the 
argument, and the authorities relating to each question presented” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Fadness v. Fadness, 667 S.E.2d 857, 865 (Va. Ct. App. 2008))). 
8. See Floyd v. Brown, 790 S.E.2d 307, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“[R]equirements as to the form 
of appellate briefs were created, not to provide an obstacle, but to aid parties in presenting their 
arguments in a manner most likely to be fully and efficiently comprehended by [the appellate court].” 
(quoting Aldalassi v. Drummond, 477 S.E.2d 372, 373 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996))); accord Henderson v. 
Henderson, No. 2007-CA-001470-MR, 2009 WL 3231254, at *1–3 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2009) 
(announcing movant’s brief as disorganized and poorly written, and addressing, as best as possible, 
where arguments lacked supporting authority, but refusing to address issues not raised at trial).  
Cf. Mitchell v. Campbell, No. 2150003, 2016 WL 4261133, at *4 (Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 12, 2016) (“It is 
not the duty of the appellate court to make arguments for the parties, nor is it the appellate court’s duty 
to conduct the parties’ legal research.” (quoting Woods v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 31 So.3d 701, 706 
(Ala. Civ. App. 2009))). 
9. See BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, TEX. SUP. CT., GUIDE TO CREATING  
ELECTRONIC APPELLATE BRIEFS 1–2 (2014), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/124903/ 
guidetocreatingelectronicappellatebriefs.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU2V-3Q48] (showing six basic steps 
to creating electronic appellate briefs, followed by requirements to “[b]ookmark the body of the brief,” 
and “[h]yperlink citations”); U.S. CT. OF APP., FIFTH CIR., CHECKLIST FOR PREPARATION OF BRIEFS, 
RECORD EXCERPTS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER PAPERS (2016), http://www.ca5. 
uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/forms-and-documents—-clerks-office/rules/brchecklist.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5RP2-YGHX] (stressing a lawyer must submit her brief with “[d]urable cover on 
both front and back”); U.S. CT. OF APP., FIFTH CIR., SAMPLE BRIEF FORMATS, [hereinafter FIFTH 
CIR. SAMPLE BRIEF FORMATS], http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/sample-
briefs/how-to-cite-to-the-record-on-appeal.pdf [https://perma.cc/G36Y-N592] (tracing specific 
requirements in compliance with the recent amendment to Fifth Circuit Rule 28.2.2, regarding citations 
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guide brief writers.10  These sort of rules, however, do not independently 
alleviate the current problems with brief writing.   
A lawyer’s brief may be inadequate for several different reasons, namely: 
procedurally,11 if it is too late, too long, or non-existent; substantively,12 by 
failing to cite authority, failing to mention the right area of law, or failing to 
include pertinent requirements; and lastly, it may just be poorly written,13 
unclear, incomprehensible, unhelpful, and unpersuasive.  Part of the issue 
with court specific or procedural and substantive rules is that case law 
analysis only binds the jurisdiction where the rule is applied, resulting in 
varying precedent.  When the subject of a decision is procedural or 
substantive, however, variation is acceptable—a higher court will eventually 
review and overrule any deficiencies. 
Ethical matters, on the other hand, are less frequently reviewed in the 
courts, and thus precedential framework is frail.  Uniform guidelines set 
forth in the Model Rules provide overarching coherence in ethical 
standards; core principals of concern present throughout each 
jurisdiction.14  Although each state is free to adopt its own version of the 
Model Rules, adhering to some sort of ethical standard is a prerequisite to 
the practice of law.15  It so follows that an argument for a more uniform 
 
to appellate records); U.S. CT. OF APP., SIXTH CIR. ECF TRAINING: FILING A BRIEF, [hereinafter 
SIXTH CIR. ECF TRAINING], http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/ 
electronic_case_filing/Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4ZE-2FF4] (acknowledging briefs must be 
submitted in a “PDF” file format). 
10. See Brief for Appellant at 1–26, Berry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 634 F. App’x 960 (5th Cir. 
2015) (No. 16-31139), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/docs/default-source/sample-briefs/appellant-
39-s-civil-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/GB6D-XZVK] (utilizing appellant’s brief as a sample).  The 
briefs referenced are part of an entire closet of briefs posted on the website for the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Each brief posted provides guidance in creating a brief of that specific 
type. 
11. E.g., In re Adinolfi, 934 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95–98 (App. Div. 2011) (per curiam) (criticizing an 
attorney who failed to timely file appellate briefs after requesting frequent extensions after passed 
deadlines). 
12. E.g., State v. Mendenhall, Nos. 20146-5-III, 21160-6-III, 2003 WL 1901276, at *8 
(Wash Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2003) (commenting on an attorney who failed to cite to a single authority in 
his brief). 
13. E.g., Pierce v. Visteon Corp., 791 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing an attorney’s 
brief writing as “careless,” and suggesting the attorney raised too many issues for the judge not to 
comment). 
14. See Robert W. Meserve, Introduction to AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT, at xv, xvii (2015) [hereinafter Introduction to Model Rules] (extending an intention of the 
Model Rules to serve as a national framework). 
15. Cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.037 (West 2015) (refusing the distribution of a new 
lawyer’s license until she takes the official statement of oath that promises moral behavior). 
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standard of brief writing can be found within the lawyer’s ethical obligations 
under the Model Rules. 
The Model Rules describes conduct, some of which a lawyer may adhere 
to, but in others she must partake.16  Generally, this conduct consists of: 
duties to clients—a lawyer must competently represent and diligently serve 
her client’s interests;17 duties to opposing counsel—a lawyer must treat 
opposing counsel fairly;18 and duties to the court—every claim submitted 
to the court must be a good faith argument for an extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law.19 
Ultimately, the Model Rules act only as guidance for state courts to adopt 
their own professional responsibility standards,20 and courts have discretion 
in punishing deficient conduct.21  Therefore, lawyers must reference 
caselaw to define what gives rise to deficient conduct within each specific 
jurisdiction.  Concerning brief guidelines, however, caselaw isn’t all that 
helpful. 
 
16. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client.” (emphasis added)), with id. r. 1.2 (“A lawyer may limit the 
scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives 
informed consent.” (emphasis added)); see also id. r. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, 
or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law.” (emphasis added)); id. r. 3.3 (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of 
a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” (emphasis added)); id. 
r. 3.7 (“A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to 
be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.” (emphasis added)). 
17. See id. r. 1.1 (requiring competence of an attorney); id. r. 1.3 (requiring diligence of an 
attorney). 
18. See id. r 1.3 (categorizing conduct a lawyer shall not engage in, because it would make things 
difficult for opposing counsel). 
19. See id. r. 3.1 (ordering a lawyer not to bring claims without merit); see also id. r. 3.3 (reducing 
false facts a lawyer introduces into a tribunal). 
20. See Introduction to Model Rules, supra note 14, at xv, xvii (indicating the Model Rules are 
“subject to modification at the level of local implementation”). 
21. See State ex rel. Cosenza v. Hill, 607 S.E.2d 811, 817 (W. Va. 2004) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts 
are given broad discretion to disqualify counsel when their continued representation of a client 
threatens the integrity of the legal profession . . . .”).  This is particularly true in situations involving 
conflicts of interest:  
A circuit court, upon motion of a party, by its inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary 
for the administration of justice, may disqualify a lawyer from a case because the lawyer’s 
representation in the case presents a conflict of interest where the conflict is such as clearly to call 
in question the fair or efficient administration of justice. 
Id. at 817. 
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Lower court precedent marginally defines the elusive bad brief,22 and the 
Supreme Court is relatively silent on brief writing.  As a response, an 
overwhelming number of secondary sources focus on improving attorney’s 
briefs.23  Ultimately, lawyers are not bound by advice laid out in these 
sources.  It follows that each court treats briefs subjectively.   
V.    STATEMENT OF FACTS: EFFECT OF CURRENT BRIEF 
WRITING STANDARDS24 
Law schools teach legal writing in varying ways, mirroring our courts’ 
foundation of subjective brief management.25  In light of legal writing’s 
current state, the ultimate issue before us is how to reconcile the pattern of 
insufficiency in brief writing.26 
Keeping in mind the close relationship of the law and the written word, 
exposure to prose in the onset of legal writing is not always the best teacher.  
One learns to write by exposure to the written word; if you want to be a 
better writer, be a better reader.27  Taking special notice of legal casebooks’ 
 
22. E.g., In re Roman, 921 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (App. Div. 2011) (per curiam) (finding sanctions 
warranted when an attorney filed “deficient briefs in multiple cases”).  The court in In re Roman hardly 
illustrates what a deficient brief actually is, despite finding that a lawyer may be sanctioned for filing 
one.  See id. at 81 (showing an attorney is subject to sanctions when, after losing contact with clients, 
he failed to file briefs, and failed to “withdraw from the case or stipulate to a dismissal”); Griffin v. 
Wainwright, 760 F.2d 1505, 1515 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[C]ounsel need not brief issues 
reasonably considered to be without merit.” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1112 (1986). 
23. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Writing Today, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 35, 37–38 (2002) 
(asserting the importance of improving the quality of judicial opinions, and how brief writing will 
facilitate improved quality due to judicial dependence on the briefs); Roger J. Miner, Professional 
Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV. 323, 331 (1999) (showing the 
importance in writing quality briefs, noting that it keeps lawyers on their toes when at opposing ends); 
Parker, supra note 2, at 597 (discussing the importance of a good legal writing program, implemented 
throughout a student’s time in law school). 
24. “Facts should be organized in a manner that rings out a clear theme without your having to 
spell the theme out.”  Laurie A. Lewis, Winning the Game of Appellate Musical Shoes: When the Appeals Band 
Plays, Jump from the Client’s to the Judge’s Shoes to Write the Statement of Facts Ballad, 46 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 983, 1011 (2011). 
25. See Parker, supra note 2, at 601 (comparing differences found in law school legal writing 
programs based on each particular law school’s sources and resources). 
26. See, e.g., Eric G. Pearson, Seventh Circuit Chastises Lawyer for Raising Too Many Issues on Appeal 
(Among a Litany of Other Missteps), NAT’L L. REV. (July 3, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/seventh-circuit-chastises-lawyer-raising-too-many-issues-appeal-among-litany-other-m 
[https://perma.cc/Q7FE-YRP7] (announcing a problem with the quality of attorney’s brief when 
Judge Easterbrook condemned it as “careless to boot” (citing Pierce v. Visteon Corp., 791 F.3d 782, 
788 (7th Cir. 2015))). 
27. Maureen B. Collins, Communication As an Art Form (Or Reading Is Fundamental), 86 ILL. B.J. 
95, 95 (1998) (“Expose yourself to good writing, and it will help you be a better writer.”). 
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decadence, a first-year law student has no business attempting to write flowery 
before she writes clearly.28  She has not developed a deep enough sense of 
the power of legal language to yield it effectively.   However, even those 
students explicitly instructed not to dabble will not always be able to help 
themselves.  Using words as the tools of our trade,29 to lawyers, writing has 
a deeper purpose.  Despite recognizable beauty in different writing styles,30 
lawyers need to treat legal writing with a certain distinction. 
As lawyers, we should strive to set clearer, improved examples so that 
writing’s nature within the profession may flourish.  This becomes a 
revolving concern when, respectfully speaking, not all judicial opinions are 
models of legal writing.31  Rather than address this issue head on, attorneys 
relish in it.32  Legal writing professors continue to teach subjectively, and 
attorneys continue to brief inadequately.  The ecosystem we live in as legal 
writers must be fed accordingly, and right now it is starving.33  Feasibly, the 
only brief writing standards regularly enforced are procedural and our 
writing remains in a perpetual state of subjectivity.34 
 
28. See Posner, supra note 23, at 36 (echoing the problem with judicial writing today is an 
“exaggerated formalism,” misleading conceptions concerning legal writing’s requirements).  Cf. id. at 38 
(analyzing the improvement of judicial opinions through improving attorney’s briefs, noting judicial 
dependence on briefs when writing opinions and thus the importance of briefing the issues with only 
the deepest understanding).  Until we can correct the case law, we will not be able to change the state 
of legal writing.  Case law correction, of course, will not occur until judicial opinions are revitalized, 
which cannot happen unless there is progression in brief writing. 
29. See Parker, supra note 2, at 562 (discussing the importance of words in the legal profession). 
30. Cf. Posner, supra note 23, at 36 (claiming legal writing prose is likely to decline if judges 
continue to use ghost writers from the best law schools). 
31. See id. (urging the problem with judicial writing today is an “exaggerated formalism” 
attempting to make judicial opinion seem more rigorous). 
32. In other words, lawyers use elevated, elegant words to disguise their misgivings. 
33. See Posner, supra note 23, at 37–38 (expounding doubt in possible solutions to the problem 
of declining judicial writing).  The text suggests four factors to improve judicial writing: 
1. Judges can make clear in their opinions and in their occasional speeches to bar groups 
and in writing for the bar what they want to see in the lawyers’ briefs . . . . 
2. Judges can take on the opinion-writing task themselves . . . . 
3. It’s an excellent mental discipline for a judicial opinion writer to pretend that he’s writing 
for a lay audience . . . . 
4. Finally, this very journal can use the newly revived idea of “shaming penalties” to frighten 
the judges into writing better . . . . 
Id. at 38. 
34. See, e.g., In re Vialet, 460 F. App’x 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (delineating the poor quality of an 
attorney’s brief as merely troubling, while the attorney’s failure to comply with procedural and 
substantive rules was punishable (citing Barry v. Holder, 322 F. App’x 22 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
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VI.    ARGUMENT35 
A.    Lawyers Have an Ethical Duty to Write Better Briefs Based on Concerns 
Within the Model Rules. 
Current brief writing standards are insufficient because they revolve only 
around the technical aspects of brief writing.  Due to the importance of the 
written word to our profession, we should not settle for this.  A closer 
analysis reveals two sets of rules exist: technical rules,36 and ethical rules.37  
Given this distinction, it is precarious to focus on only the technical aspects 
of brief writing.38  Levying the requirements of the Model Rules in 
accordance with current brief writing standards suggests hope for an 
evolved state of brief writing, encouraging that “[i]t is not enough for an 
appellant in his brief to raise issues; they must be pressed in a professionally 
 
35. “The [a]rgument is the guts of your brief, the part for which all the rest is just preparation 
and summary.”  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 98. 
36. See, e.g., SIXTH CIR. ECF TRAINING, supra note 9, http://www.ca6.uscourts. 
gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/electronic_case_filing/Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4ZE-2FF4] 
(paraphrasing instructions and requirements for filing an electronic brief). 
37. See, e.g., MODEL RULES Preamble and Scope ¶¶ 7, 20 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (appointing 
ethical guidelines, but no obligation to enforce them). 
38. In fact, a court of appeals may discipline an attorney for “failure to comply with any court 
rule” or for “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.”  FED. R. APP. P. 46(c) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
at least one circuit has adopted into its own rules a provision providing that:  
An attorney . . . may be subject to discipline or other corrective measures for any failure to comply 
with a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, a Local Rule of the Court, an order or other 
instruction of the Court, or a rule of professional conduct or responsibility of the Court, or any other 
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. 
In re Vialet, 460 F. App’x at 37 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  This shows that courts have the 
authority to discipline attorneys for ethical misconduct as well as for violations of substantive and 
procedural rules.  Id.  Correspondingly, there are sources imposing professionalism as a requirement 
for brief writing, despite explicit force within the Model Rules.  E.g., Linc Fin. Corp. v. Onwuteaka, 
129 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 1997) (proposing issues raised in a brief must be made in a professionally 
responsible fashion).  The mystery lies in what defines an issue briefed in a professionally responsible 
fashion.  Certainly, it includes refraining from allowing non-lawyers to draft and file pleadings.  See 
Graham v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3: 04-CV-2461-B, 2006 WL 2468715, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 
2006) (ordering plaintiff to pay defendant’s attorney’s fees, and finding plaintiff’s previous attorney’s 
failure to comply with the federal rules “should have put plaintiff and her current attorney on notice of 
the importance of filing a summary judgment response in a timely manner” (emphasis added)); In re 
Sobolevsky, 944 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (App. Div. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming the suspension of an 
attorney who submitted briefs of “shockingly poor quality,” shown by incorrect client names, irrelevant 
boilerplate, and reference to evidence that had not been submitted, all while relying on his paralegal’s 
work without review). 
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responsible fashion.”39  In essence, we must view inadequate brief writing 
as an ethical lapse—not just a procedural one. 
Under the Model Rules, lawyers have a “special responsibility for the 
quality of justice.”40  This includes a “duty to uphold legal process,” 
meaning to “seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the 
administration of justice[,] and the quality of service rendered by the legal 
profession.”41  In other words, the Model Rules emphasize the lawyer’s 
important role in preserving the profession’s esteem. 
1.    Health of the Law  
Bad precedent is harmful to the profession’s well-being.  When a judge 
crafts an opinion from a lawyer’s poorly written brief, the resulting 
precedent is similarly lacking.  Model Rule 3.342 declares: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority 
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to 
the position of the client and not disclosed by the opposing counsel.43 
This rule’s purpose is to ensure the court’s full ability to make the most 
precise and informed decisions in light of controlling authority.44  This 
speaks to the heart of the issue, and works to shield the law from the 
corruption of unrelated resolutions.45 
 
39. Linc Fin. Corp., 129 F.3d at 921 (quoting Pearce v. Sullivan, 871 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1989)).  
“Every brief provides its author with the opportunity to make an impression as a lawyer worth listening 
to.  A brief that is measured, careful, and professional will make that impression for you.”  Kethledge, 
supra note 1, at 25, 27. 
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
41. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. 
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
43. Id. 
44. See Miner, supra note 23, at 330 (“[T]he best and most appropriate assurance that adverse 
authorities and arguments will come out is the adversary system itself.” (quoting Monroe H. Freedman, 
Arguing the Law in an Adversary System, 16 GA. L. REV. 833, 838 (1982))).  To elaborate: 
No matter how enamored we are of the adversary system as the great engine in the search for the 
truth, we must recognize its limitations and cabin it with as many rules as are necessary to maintain 
as even a playing field as possible . . . .  Not all attorneys are equal in skill, and there is no reason 
to permit the stronger to play the hidden ball trick with the weaker. 
Id. 
45. See, e.g., Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Moreover, ‘[an 
appellate] brief cannot “be used as a vehicle for the conveyance of hatred, contempt, insult, disrespect, 
or profession[al] discourtesy or any nature for the court of review, trial judge, or opposing counsel.”’” 
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Protecting the law’s health further includes a duty to present the court 
with the best possible arguments.  The brief is a central component of trial 
because lawyers submit arguments through written briefs.46  Juxtaposing 
this with Model Rule 1.1,47 the competence of a lawyer’s brief speaks to 
competent trial preparation.48  Model Rule 1.1 pronounces: 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.49 
Many judges formulate opinions on a case after only reading the briefs—
using oral argument as merely a supplemental tool to clarify issues and ask 
questions.50  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently came to 
St. Mary’s School of Law and heard two oral arguments.  I found it remarkable 
that in one of the hearings—a death penalty case—counsel was allotted so 
little time that he barely finished his first issue.  The judges arrived 
prepared—clearly, they had read the briefs—and before counsel finished 
speaking his name, they began firing off questions.  In contrast to my 
previous presumption on oral argument, the ball was very much in the 
judges’ court (pun intended).  The experience spotlighted the brief’s role in 
appellate practice; relying on oral argument alone, the judges would not have 
reached the heart of the issues.  Due to an appellate court’s heavy 
dependence on briefs, it follows that an incompetent brief is detrimental to 
the appellate process.51 
 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Cochran v. Cochran, 717 N.E.2d 892, 895 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999))). 
46. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1095 (“Many of the fine appellate judges and lawyers who have 
written on brief writing agree on the principal purpose and attributes of a helpful brief . . . .”). 
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. See Robert J. Martineau, The Value of Appellate Oral Argument: A Challenge to the Conventional 
Wisdom, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13 (1986) (“It is contended that some judges, for example, assimilate ideas 
more effectively through oral rather than written communication.” (citing PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET 
AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 17 (1976))).  But cf. id. at 14 (explaining the justifications for the use of oral 
argument in appellate cases do not necessarily support a need for oral argument in all cases). 
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (promoting 
competent representation by requiring standards that are reasonably necessary for representation).  After 
all, if a brief is essential, then is it not reasonable to say an insufficient brief constitutes a lack of 
“thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  Id.; see, e.g., In re Liu, 
977 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7–8 (App. Div. 2013) (per curiam) (echoing public censure was appropriate reciprocal 
discipline for submitting deficient and untimely briefs in connection with petitions for review in 
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A standard under the Model Rules would further ask lawyers to evaluate 
the brief writing of their colleagues.  Model Rule 8.352 states: 
A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that 
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall 
inform the appropriate professional authority.53 
Concerning brief writing specifically, failure to act under Model Rule 8.3 
allows a number of inadequate briefs to slip through the cracks.54  And,55 
the greater the number of inadequate briefs circulating the dockets, the 
greater the chances of inadequacies infecting case law and legal precedent.56  
“Obviously, a lawyer cannot argue to distinguish, modify or overrule an 
adverse precedent not mentioned in the brief[,]”57 thus, a duty to report 
opposing counsel who acts as such protects the court’s ability to make fully 
informed decisions on the law.  In other words, failing to report this conduct 
may manipulate the law, whether or not manipulation is intended. 
 
immigration cases, which would also constitute misconduct in New York under the former code of 
professional conduct). 
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
53. Id. 
54. By “slip through the cracks,” I am referring to conduct that should not be accepted, but 
that judges allow to pass anyway—usually in efforts to protect the client from extra attorney’s fees or 
case delay.  There is a general consensus that courts see it as the lawyer’s duty to prevent these instances 
of misconduct.  See Ishimatu v. Royal Crown Ins. Corp., No. 06-0043-GA, 2010 WL 2219348, at *28 
(N. Mar. I. June 1, 2010) (highlighting a prior decision denying attorney’s fees for “reworking apposing 
counsel’s brief into a better form”).  A brief may not be incompetent just because it is poor and 
muddled; I am suggesting that a lawyer should realize there is a scale of bad brief writing, and past a 
certain point, a brief becomes incompetent and is therefore reportable. 
55. Believe it or not, it is actually acceptable to start a sentence with “and.”  See SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 63 (dispelling hesitation to start a sentence with “and”). 
56. See Miner, supra note 23, at 331 (“[T]here is no reason to say that it is wrong only for the 
lawyer to omit the citation of contrary authority known to him or her.  With modern computer research 
techniques, precedent cases are easily knowable to all lawyers.  Beyond all this, it may very well be 
counterproductive to one’s case to omit the citation of authority, whatever its source.”). 
57. Id. 
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2.    Zealous Advocacy 
The Model Rules call for the lawyer to be a zealous advocate,58 meaning 
she must act ethically to change the law in favor of her client’s outcome.59  
Conceivably, a lawyer who writes a brief failing to convey her client’s case 
has breached her duty of zealous advocacy.60  Model Rule 1.361 states: 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client.62 
Its commentary further asserts: 
A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.  A lawyer is not 
bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a 
client.  For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional 
discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued.63 
Hence, a lawyer fulfills her duty of advocacy when she raises issues carefully 
and strategically in her brief.64  Focusing on a few chosen issues is acting 
diligently on her client’s behalf, assuring competence and confidence.65 
 
58. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (“A lawyer 
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy 
upon the client’s behalf.” (emphasis added)). 
59. See Principle of Partisanship, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Also termed doctrine 
of zealous advocacy.”). 
60. Cf. John E. Nelson, III, Marshalling Authority, APP. ADVOC., Winter 1989, at 10, 10 
(“Facilitating the court’s production of its opinion by supplying even the most elementary building 
blocks will establish the advocate’s craftsmanship and credibility.  In a close case, the judge may resolve 
the issue in favor of the side more clearly displaying such qualities.”). 
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
64. “As an advocate, you want to find the premise that will pull the court toward your 
conclusion and then make that premise explicit in your statement of the issue.”  SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 3, at 84.  “If the court decides to answer the question you pose, it will probably reach the 
conclusion you urge.”  Id. 
65. See, e.g., Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Zeal: Teddy Roosevelt’s Life and Writing, 10 LEGAL COMM. 
& RHETORIC: JALWD 125, 127 (2013) (“The word ‘zeal’ is used here not as an appeal to the emotions 
or passion of the reader but as a way to convince the reader that the author actually believes what the 
author writes.”). 
 
2017] Comment 205 
3.    Judicial Economy 
Poorly written briefs are a huge contributor to the decline of judicial 
economy.66  However, together, Model Rule 3.167 and Model Rule 3.268 
move towards protecting it,69 instilling a duty to only bring the most 
pertinent arguments.  Model Rule 3.2 asserts: 
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with 
the interests of the client.70 
In concert, Model Rule 3.1 states: 
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, 
which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or 
reversal of existing law.71 
 
66. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1098 (“To write a [q]uality brief, a lawyer must first understand 
an aspect of being a judge I frankly did not comprehend until I became one—volume and limited 
resources.”). 
67. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
68. Id. r. 3.2. 
69. The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary defines judicial economy as follows: 
Reducing the court’s case load.  Judicial economy is the goal of many judges: to reduce the number 
of cases pending in court by reducing the number of cases brought and by simplifying those that 
are filed.  Judicial economy, carefully pursued, is in the interests of the bench, the public, and the litigants, 
by reducing the costs and burdens of litigation.  Procedural devices such as simplified pleading, joinder 
of claims or parties, class actions, and tightly enforced calendars are tools of this pursuit.  Even 
so, judicial economy is a dangerous concept when invoked to close the courthouse door to claims 
that merit relief in law or equity. 
Judicial Economy, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (Compact ed. 2011) (emphasis 
added).  Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary describes judicial economy as: 
Efficiency in the operation of the courts and the judicial system; esp., the efficient management 
of litigation so as to minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and resources.  
A court can enter a variety of orders to promote judicial economy.  For instance, a court may 
consolidate two cases for trial to save the court and the parties from having two trials, or it may 
order a separate trial on certain issues if doing so would provide the opportunity to avoid a later 
trial that would be more complex and time-consuming. 
Judicial Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). 
70. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
71. Id. r. 3.1 (emphasis added). 
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The idea is to prevent unnecessary information from delaying and 
disrupting judicial proceedings.72  When a brief asserts frivolous arguments, 
the judge’s vision of the case and path to resolution are clouded.73  
Furthermore, this makes it harder for courts to make a decision, breaching 
the lawyer’s duty to take “reasonable efforts to expedite litigation” under 
Model Rule 3.2.74 
Certain rules requiring defense counsel to answer each and every claim 
the plaintiff raises in her complaint75 could be onerous when a plaintiff 
raises frivolous issues.  Therefore, acting in accordance with the concept of 
fairness to opposing counsel, the Model Rules further strengthen judicial 
economy under Rule 3.4,76 which proclaims: 
A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible 
evidence . . . .77 
A lawyer who must answer a complaint with an excessive number of claims 
spends more time responding, and charges more fees to her client.78  
 
72. See id. (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.” (emphasis added)). 
73. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1096 (“Writing a [q]uality brief requires an understanding of 
what judges need from a brief and an appreciation of why they need it.”); see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (forbidding a lawyer from asserting issues without a 
basis in law or fact). 
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must admit or deny the 
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”).  Further, affirmative defenses must be raised in 
the answer, or they are waived.  Id. R. 8(c) (requiring an affirmative defense to be raised in the answer 
or it is waived). 
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
77. Id. 
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) (contending parties must admit or deny each and every allegation 
asserted in the complaint).  But when a complaint filed against a client contains frivolous claims, must 
the attorney answer each claim?  At least one court seems to think so, considering not responding to 
issues raised by opposing counsel is an unfavorable offense.  See Hodge v. McGowan, 29 V.I. 142, 
147 n.5 (1993) (“More disturbing is the unwillingness of either counsel to address issues raised by the 
other . . . .”).  Judges most often place the monetary burden of this extra work upon the attorney—
rather than the client—as punishment.  See In re Estate of Malite, 2010 MP 20U, ¶ 45 (finding an award 
of attorney fees involves determining both “whether the requested fees are reasonable[,]” and “the 
appropriate fee award”); see also Camacho v. J.C. Tenorio Enters., Inc., 2 N. Mar. I. 509, 512 (1992) 
(deciding against awarding costs associated with an attorney rewording and reorganizing a brief when 
it was unnecessary under the circumstances); Ishimatu v. Royal Crown Ins. Corp., No. 06-0043-GA, 
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Ultimately, briefs that assert only a few, well-chosen arguments allow 
opposing counsel the freedom to appropriately respond, and give the judge 
full access to the most prevalent issues.79  Preserving judicial time and 
resources is invaluable because it frees up judges to spend time where it is 
needed: crafting well-thought-out opinions.80 
B.    Imposing an Ethical Brief Requirement in Addition to Current Brief Writing 
Standards Is a Necessity. 
A revival of quality legal writing relies on the ethical resuscitation of 
briefs.  Case law on brief writing is frail and diseased: there is no precise way 
to determine what is unacceptable, and—perhaps even more concerning—
there is sparse to zero controlling precedent to help an attorney better her 
brief writing.  Because of the necessity of certain ethical obligations to law 
practice, there is a space within current brief writing standards where ethical 
brief requirements fit comfortably. 
1.    Secondary Sources 
An overwhelming amount of secondary material calls out for better brief 
writing.81  Often written by sitting judges, the intended audience is the 
 
2010 WL 2219348, at *28 (N. Mar. I. June 1, 2010) (“[A]n award of fees must be reasonable, and fees 
for certain practices and conduct will almost always be unrecoverable.”). 
79. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (forbidding a lawyer 
from alluding to any matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or supported by facts).  
The Model Rules also require the following: 
A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct 
a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; [or] fail to 
disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be 
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . . 
Id. r. 3.3. 
80. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1098–101 (construing time judges waste reading irrelevant 
arguments within briefs as taking away from time spent on other judicial functions); Judicial Economy, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (noting the importance of the efficient management of 
litigation so as not to waste the judiciary’s time or resources). 
81. See James H. Coleman, Jr., Appellate Advocacy and Decisionmaking in State Appellate Courts in the 
Twenty-First Century, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1998) (stressing the imperative importance 
in a lawyer’s ability to “[s]tate the issues early, clearly, accurately, and concisely”); Duncan, supra note 2, 
at 1101–04 (listing ways attorneys can write more helpful briefs by showcasing the importance of 
quality briefs); Kethledge, supra note 1, at 25 (“Filing a brief with these mistakes is like walking up to 
the podium with stains on your shirt.  The court will be reluctant to trust your judgment.”); Robert M. 
Tyler, Jr., Practices and Strategies for a Successful Appeal, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 617, 647 (1993) 
(surveying important aspects of appellate procedure—namely how brief writing fits in and how to 
create convincing briefs).  One of these authors has a plethora of advice for brief writers, most 
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functioning legal community, and not first-year law students.82  This 
suggests a large number of judges willing the brief’s evolution. 
The premise of their argument runs back to judicial economy.  Appellate 
judges reading poorly written briefs might find themselves glazing over 
arguments or even failing to understand them.83  When faced with this 
issue, the judge has three options: 1) spend more time trying to decode the 
brief; 2) ask counsel to re-write the brief; or—perhaps the most 
detrimental—3) render a less informed decision.84  The vast number of 
secondary materials indicate an awareness and fear for such harm and reach 
towards ethical writing as a solution.85 
 
notably: “When reviewing the factual and procedural history, the writer should remember that from 
the perspective of an appellate judge, the cold trial record ‘is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the 
substance nor the flavor of the peach before it was dried.’”  Coleman, supra, at 1082 (quoting Trusky 
v. Ford Motor Co., 88 A.2d 235, 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)).  Another calls out for a brief 
writer to “think of one point, above all, that you want the court to remember from your brief—and 
then put it in that first sentence.  The sentence should be thematic, expressing an original thought that 
transcends the particular doctrines at issue.”  Kethledge, supra note 1, at 25, 27. 
82. Compare Duncan, supra note 2, at 1096–98 (summarizing the difficulty judges have in dealing 
with the briefs in appellate cases, and explaining the ways in which attorneys can write more helpful 
briefs for appellate judges), with JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL 
WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 11–12 (5th ed. 2013) (introducing basic concepts of the law and legal 
writing, i.e., sources and the hierarchy of laws, within a section titled “Introduction to Law”). 
83. See Early v. Toledo Blade Co., No. G-4801-CI-0199003434-000, 2010 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 
20583, at *6 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 20, 2010) (sanctioning an attorney for misstating the law and 
filing briefs “so poorly written ‘they were virtually unreadable’”). 
84. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1098–100 (reiterating reasons good briefs are helpful to judges). 
85. See Miner, supra note 23, at 331 (“My own view is that candor to the tribunal should require 
even more than the Rule requires.  I think that a lawyer should cite pertinent authority from other 
jurisdictions to help the court in its labors, even if the adversary fails to do so.”).  Some seem to think 
that more focus on ethics, in general (and in writing), would solve a lot of our legal system’s problems.  
See Frances C. DeLaurentis, When Ethical Worlds Collide: Teaching Novice Legal Writers to Balance the Duties 
of Zealous Advocacy and Candor to the Tribunal, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 38 (2014) (illustrating deficiencies in 
the study of ethics in law schools).  For example: 
All too often law school fails to provide students with knowledge of the governing ethics rules as 
applied to legal documents, understanding of the judiciary’s expectations with respect to candor, 
and appreciation of the complexities inherent in evaluating authorities.  While law students are 
required to take classes in basic substantive law such as torts, property, contracts, civil procedure, 
constitutional law, and criminal law; an introductory course in legal research and writing; and one 
professional responsibility or ethics class, none of these classes necessarily prepares students to 
engage in meaningful discussion of professional or ethical issues in writing. 
DeLaurentis, supra, at 5. 
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2.    Anders Briefs 
Concern for judicial economy really comes alive as a result of the 
increasing volume of appellate cases.86  Created as a product of this rise in 
case load, the Anders brief87 serves as a placeholder; ensuring compliance 
with ethical and other duties inherent to the practice of law—particularly 
advocacy.88  Describing the Anders brief, the Supreme Court stated: 
[A defense counsel’s] role as an advocate requires that he support his client’s 
appeal to the best of his ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case to be 
wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise 
the court and request permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, 
be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might 
arguably support the appeal.  A copy of the counsel’s brief should be furnished 
[to] the indigent and time allow[ing] him to raise any points that he chooses; 
the court—not counsel—then proceeds, after full examination of all the 
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.  If it so finds it 
may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as 
federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if 
state law so requires.  On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points are 
arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to 
decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal.89 
  
 
86. See Judicial Economy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (recommending a reach for 
the efficient operation of courts); Duncan, supra note 2, at 1098–100 (warning of an increasing number 
of cases at the appellate level, and the increased difficulty judges have in handling these cases). 
87. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1988) (“The so-called ‘Anders brief’ serves the valuable 
purpose of assisting the court in determining both that counsel in fact conducted the required detailed 
review of the case and that the appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary 
presentation.”). 
88. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (allowing the attorney to withdraw from 
the case even though her client wished to pursue an appeal because the attorney believed the case was 
frivolous, and the withdrawal request accompanied a brief pointing to any arguable support for appeal 
in the record). 
89. Id. 
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Ostensibly, Anders briefs allow an attorney to reconcile her duty not to bring 
frivolous claims under the Model Rules, without depriving her client of the 
constitutional right to appeal.90 
Assuming appellate case load continues to rise, lawyers will likely find 
Anders briefs to be an increasingly valuable tool.91  This threatens danger 
because Anders briefs, in essence, allow attorneys to legally excuse ethical 
obligations that might otherwise be burdensome.  Accordingly, one wonders 
how often a lawyer mitigates the integrity of her client’s claim—consciously 
or unconsciously—due to time constraints or an inability to competently 
handle her workload.92 
3.    Court-Specific Rules 
Those (un)lucky enough to have to write a true appellate brief face  
other problems.  Court-specific rules for briefs are mostly technical  
writing guidelines that focus on procedure, or merely amend rules of 
procedure in the context of briefs;93 they do not help a writer in crafting a 
 
90. Compare id. (outlining situations where an attorney may withdraw from the case even though 
her client wishes to pursue appeal), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2017) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued. . . .  In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with 
the lawyer, as to the plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.”), 
and id. r. 3.3(a)(3) (implying a check on the Anders notions because “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . 
offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”). 
91. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1098–100 (exploring the increasing number of cases at the 
appellate level and the difficulty judges have in dealing with the briefs for these cases). 
 92. See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/09/us/09defender.html [https://perma.cc/46EU-RSBQ] 
(“Public defenders’ offices in at least seven states are refusing to take on new cases or have sued to 
limit them, citing overwhelming workloads that they say undermine the constitutional right to counsel 
for the poor.”). 
93. See HAWTHORNE, supra note 9, at 1–31 (including the procedural steps required to submit 
an electronic brief); Order Adopting Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 21c and Amendments to Texas 
Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 21, 21a, 45, 57, and 502; Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 6, 9, and 48; 
Supreme Court Order Directing the Form of the Appellate Record, Misc. Docket No. 13-9165, at 1–
33 (Tex. Dec. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Order Adopting Texas Rules], available at 
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/273991/order-13-9165.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR27-MCWL] 
(developing procedural aspects to be followed in brief submission). 
 
2017] Comment 211 
good argument.94  Ironically, the few court-specific rules that do direct the 
form of a brief are vague.95  This is bothersome to the attorney striving to 
write a quality brief;96 but to the client—and especially to the court—this is 
detrimental. 
4.    Rules of Procedure 
Not surprisingly, there are procedural rules protecting similar notions 
such as those found in the Model Rules.  For example, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure involving trial, oral argument, and discovery all prevent 
harassment and unnecessary delay to the legal system,97 similar to Model 
Rules 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.98  However, regardless of whether a brief is—or is  
  
 
94. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Tr. Nat’l Ass’n v. Junior, 57 N.E.3d 588, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) 
(promulgating court rules restricting the form and contents of a brief, noting such rules are not arbitrary 
because their purpose is to provide the reviewing court an understanding of the issues involved 
(quoting Tannenbaum v. Lincoln Nat’l Bank, 493 N.E.2d 143, 144 (1986))). 
95. See Order Adopting Texas Rules, supra note 93, at 34–67 (creating guidelines for the form 
in which briefs are to be submitted); see also FIFTH CIR. SAMPLE BRIEF FORMATS, supra note 9 
(promoting the parties’ use of the ROA citation format only for electronic records on appeal including 
“the case number followed by a page number, in the format ‘YY-NNNNN.###’”). 
96. Particularly if they attempt to act competently, yet still get it wrong.  There are some 
provisions within the Model Rules that allow a court to have broad discretion when imposing sanctions 
for a violation of state court rules; however, these are suggested provisions and not per se violations 
of the Model Rules.  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) 
(insisting that a lawyer “shall provide competent representation to a client” (emphasis added)), with 
id. r. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”).  Using the word “reasonably” indicates a decision-maker 
has the discretion to make decisions, acting as the reasonable person.  See Reasonable Person, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[A] person who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence, and judgment that society requires of its members for the protection of their own and of 
others’ interests.”). 
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (requiring pleadings not be “presented for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, [or] cause unnecessary delay”); id. R. 26(g) (mandating discovery requests are “not 
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, [or] cause unnecessary delay”); id. R. 42(a)(3) 
(allowing the court to “issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay”). 
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (relaying a lawyer’s 
duty to only bring or defend a proceeding by meritorious claims and contentions); id. r. 3.2 (addressing 
a lawyer’s duty to reasonably expedite litigation within her client’s interest); id. r. 3.3 (proclaiming a 
lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal). 
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not99—procedurally sound, there are other grounds which affect whether a 
brief is inadequate.  These are the inadequacies that pose the real confusion. 
5.    Case Law 
Examples of existing precedent include a focus on: deficiency,100 
underdeveloped arguments,101 meritorious arguments on appeal,102 
 
99. See Pierce v. Visteon Corp., 791 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2015) (addressing the attorney’s 
brief, noting it breached procedural and substantive rules, and that it had problems beyond such aspects 
because it presented thirteen issues for decision).  “We have mentioned [attorney’s] failure to comply 
with our order to address the interaction between Rule 23(c)(3) and Rule 58.  And his brief on the 
merits has problems beyond those pointed out already.”  Id.  The court asserts that bringing thirteen 
issues up for discussion violates the principle that “appellate counsel must concentrate attention on 
the best issues.”  Id.  That principle is based on the idea that:  
To brief more than three or four issues not only diverts the judges’ attention but also means that 
none of the issues will be addressed in the necessary depth; an appellate brief covering [thirteen] 
issues can spend only a few pages on each. 
Id.  “The brief’s writing is careless to boot; it conveys the impression of ‘dictated but not read.’”  Id.  
Two sentences in the attorney’s brief read: 
This Court should be entered a high daily statutory penalty in this matter.  Respectfully, the award 
of the District Court to the contrary law and an abuse of discretion. 
Id.  The court goes on to say that there’s more to the attorney’s brief that is equally ungrammatical.  Id.  
Finally, the opinion concludes that, “[Attorney] is in no position to contend that his compensation is 
too low.”  Id.; see also Pearson, supra note 26 (appraising a judicial opinion where the judge speaks out 
against an attorney’s brief). 
100. See In re Vialet, 460 F. App’x 30, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (ruling public censure is an appropriate 
punishment for a lawyer who “filed deficient briefs in several cases, in violation of Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 28, and continued to do so even after receiving notice of the Court’s referral 
order”). 
101. See Fielder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-10325, 2014 WL 1207865, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 24, 2014) (warning routine filing of “one size fits all” briefs containing conclusory assertions and 
underdeveloped arguments would be reviewed, and that sanctions would be imposed if continued).  
But see Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-CV-10833, 2015 WL 1300040, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 23, 2015) (noting attorney’s use of underdeveloped arguments in his briefs “amounts to ‘conduct 
[that] is egregious . . . to bad faith, resulting in the gross misrepresentation of his client,’” yet does not 
warrant sanctions, for the court usually reserves sanctions for intentional or knowing violations 
(alteration in original) (quoting Report & Recommendation Cross Motions for Summary Judgment 
(Dkt. 9, 11) at 21, Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-CV-10833 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2015))). 
102. See Lively v. Henderson, No. 14-05-01229-CV, 2007 WL 3342031, at *6 (Tex. App—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (declaring arguments on appeal, although without 
merit, were not egregious circumstances warranting sanctions). 
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compliance with court orders regarding briefs,103 untimely submissions,104 
misstatements,105 copying arguments,106 and poor language.107 
In State v. Mendenhall,108 the court demonstrated caselaw’s overarching 
message on brief writing,109 ruling that briefs may be “poorly written, [yet] 
adequate.”110  The problem with opinions like Mendenhall is that attorneys 
 
103. See People v. Reardon, No. 15PDJ100, 2016 WL 3950724, at *5 (Colo. O.P.D.J. June 1, 
2016) (sanctioning an attorney who repeatedly, and knowingly, failed to comply with the 10th Circuit’s 
admonishment of attorney’s insufficient briefs); In re James, 911 A.2d 409, 409–10 (D.C. 2006) (per 
curiam) (warranting disbarment where the attorney failed to file a brief, as required by several court 
orders). 
104. See In re Rochon, 746 A.2d 876, 876–77 (D.C. 2000) (per curiam) (admitting public censure 
furthered public policy when the attorney frequently ignored briefing deadlines and, one week before 
an extended deadline, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel); In re Liu, 977 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (App. Div. 
2013) (per curiam) (enforcing public censure as reciprocal discipline for submitting deficient and 
untimely briefs in connection with petitions for review in immigration cases); In re Adinolfi, 
934 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96–97 (App. Div. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming public censure for an attorney who 
failed to timely file appellate briefs and requested frequent extensions to file after passed deadlines); In 
re Kramer, 672 N.Y.S.2d 895, 896–97 (App. Div. 1998) (per curiam) (issuing a three-year suspension 
for an attorney who submitted opening briefs late). 
105. See In re Mundie, 945 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (App. Div. 2013) (per curiam) (recommending 
public censure for attorney who, among other misgivings, submitted a brief containing misstatements 
of petitioner’s name and facts). 
106. See id. (affirming public censure for an attorney who copied—verbatim—“extensive and 
significant portions of . . . legal argument” from brief filed by another attorney in another case). 
107. See Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 150 N.W. 1101, 1102 (Wis. 1915) (striking from the 
files a brief using blatantly disrespectful language, which cast the court’s discretion in a less than 
favorable light).  The court found the language in appellants’ brief suggested that courts of equity use 
their powers to reach a personally desirable end.  Id.  The court responded: 
[Such language] presents a most flagrant violation of professional ethics and of the duty and 
respect which attorneys owe courts . . . .  Counsel for appellants will be allowed no costs, either 
for printing the brief or for attorney’s fees . . . .  [A]ppellants’ brief upon the motion is ordered 
stricken from the files. 
Id. 
108. State v. Mendenhall, Nos. 20146-5-III, 21160-6-III, 2003 WL 1901276 (Wash. Ct. App. 
Apr. 17, 2003). 
 109. Id. at *8.  Per Washington state law, this unpublished opinion has no precedential value 
and is in no way binding on any court.  Washington law does permit a party to cite to this opinion if 
permitted to do so within that jurisdiction.  Therefore, please understand that I am using this opinion 
for demonstrative purposes only. 
110. Id.  The Mendenhall court does not state precisely why it found the brief to be adequate, but 
it is possible that the court didn’t want to create a bright line rule and be bound to impose and enforce 
such a rule on its future litigants. 
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are left with no suggestable guideline as how to better their brief writing.111  
This poses a greater threat than precedent failing to show brief writers what 
not to do.  It is not logical to believe that attorneys, when writing a brief, 
check controlling authority to determine whether they might decrease or 
enhance the quality of the brief.112  It is frightening to imagine that an 
attorney might think to themselves: “I don’t feel like citing to any authority 
in my brief, so instead, I’ll just look up case law and determine what’s 
acceptable to do in lieu of citing to authority.”113  It is even more 
frightening when opinions like Mendenhall become controlling authority.114 
6.    Ethical Obligations  
Arguably, if before consulting case law you suspect your brief is 
inadequate, then it probably is.  When a new lawyer is sworn in to the 
practice of law, she must take an oath before receiving her license.115  The 
oath requires the attorney to solemnly swear, to “discharge the attorney’s 
duty to the attorney’s client to the best of the attorney’s ability,” and to 
“conduct oneself with integrity and civility in dealing and communicating 
with the court and all parties.”116  It follows that a lawyer does not discharge 
her duties to the best of her ability when she produces insufficient briefs.  
Thus, poor brief writing breaches the promise she exchanged with the Bar 
in consideration for her law license.  That is unacceptable because her ethical 
duties are a requisite to legal practice. 
Requiring lawyers to conform to ethical standards of practice requires 
them to understand the problems within current standards of brief writing 
and to seek improvement.117  “Neglect of these responsibilities 
 
111. The Model Rules state that “a lawyer should seek improvement of the law,” as well as the 
“quality of service rendered by the legal profession.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble 
and Scope ¶ 6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (emphasis added). 
112. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 2003 WL 1901276, at *8 (suggesting a brief was poorly written, yet 
adequate when it failed to cite authority but cited to the record instead). 
113. Cf. id. (permitting a similar writing error, yet unrelated attorney thought-process). 
114. See id. (describing a brief as adequate when counsel failed to cite to authority because the 
court understood what he was attempting to say). 
115. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 82.037 (West 2015). 
116. Id. § 82.037(a)(3)–(4). 
117. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) 
(“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.  The fulfillment of this role requires an 
understanding by lawyers of their relationship to our legal system.” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 7 (“A lawyer 
should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to 
exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”); accord id. ¶ 6 (“[A] lawyer should seek 
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compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest 
which it serves,”118 and thus, imposing additional ethical requirements for 
brief writing is not only important to the future of the law, but it is also a 
necessary and required responsibility of lawyers.119 
Several provisions prevent attorneys from being able to contract out of 
their ethical obligations.  A lawyer is subject to liability for legal malpractice 
if a client establishes four elements: (1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and 
(4) damages; yet the lawyer may limit her duties by contractual agreement 
through an engagement letter.120  However, limiting the scope of this duty 
still must coincide with her ethical obligations; while writing the engagement 
letter and performing legal services, a lawyer must always be competent.121  
This hinges on a notion of fairness; a lawyer should not be able to contract 
out of duties she is obligated to follow once admitted to legal practice. 
Markedly, competence is subsumed within all aspects of a lawyer’s 
practice of law, for under the Model Rules, “[a] lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client,”122 which recognizes “[i]n all 
professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and 
diligent.”123  Thus, competence is an essential quality to legal practice and 
is not one of the limited aspects that a lawyer may contract out of.124  I 
suspect this is because competency is central and vital to the practice of 
law—and brief writing. 
There are concepts discussed in the law of business organizations125 that 
are similar to the role of competency in the Model Rules.  For example, the 
 
improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of 
service rendered by the legal profession.”). 
118. Id. at ¶ 12. 
119. See Posner, supra note 23, at 38 (“[F]or if the briefs improve, so will the opinions, given the 
judges’ heavy dependence on the briefs.”). 
120. Lopez v. Clifford Law Offices, 841 N.E.2d 465, 470–71 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citations 
omitted).  Whether, or not, there was an attorney-client relationship, defines the lawyer’s duty.  Id. 
121. See id. at 476–77 (holding the absence of an engagement letter expressly showing the 
attorney accepted plaintiff as a client does not preclude a previous lawyer’s liability to plaintiff for 
incompetent work). 
122. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (emphasis added). 
123. Id. Preamble and Scope ¶ 4 (emphasis added). 
124. See id. r. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may limit the scope of representation if the limitation is 
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”).  Of course, what client 
would consent to representation where a brief need not be competent? 
125. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (defining several instances 
where the financial responsibility of directors may never be limited—specifically those subsumed 
within the duty of loyalty). 
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duty of loyalty is necessary to the carrying out of business and may not be 
contractually limited. 
In In re Caremark International, Inc., Derivative Litigation,126 shareholders 
accused the directors of violating their duty to monitor contracts that 
officers executed on behalf of the corporation.  Although evidence showed 
directors knew the contracts were not in legal compliance,127 the directors 
moved to dismiss based on a clause within the corporation’s articles of 
incorporation eliminating director liability for this duty.128  Such a limitation 
was within the law because the duty to monitor an employee’s acts fell within 
a director’s duty of care, as opposed to the duty of loyalty; accordingly, the 
corporation could legally elect to shield its directors from liability.129  The 
shareholders argued the directors should be liable despite this shield from 
liability; the failure to take adequate precaution with knowledge of 
noncompliance with the law was a breach of the duty of loyalty, which may 
never be limited.130  The court agreed and reasoned that the directors 
should not be able to act in bad faith in regards to the corporation and still 
escape liability; the duty of loyalty is only intact when there is an actual good 
faith effort to comply with the law.131  In accepting the shareholders’ 
argument, the Caremark court acknowledges fairness and an understanding 
that liability for some duties is inescapable because of their vital 
importance.132 
Suitably, the argument for the necessity of ethical brief writing is that the 
Model Rules show a universal understanding that it is unfair for a lawyer to 
 
126. In re Caremark Int’l, Inc., Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
127. Id. at 963. 
128. Id. at 965.  See BUS. § 2.02(b)(4) (providing a company may elect to limit its directors’ duty 
of care shielding directors from liability for certain acts). 
129. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. 
130. See id. (explaining the complaint did not allege self-dealing or “loyalty-type” problems, but 
was rather concerned with an alleged “breach of care”); see also BUS. § 2.02(b)(4) (defining the duty of 
loyalty as an instance where financial responsibility of directors may never be limited).  Before Caremark, 
decisions concerning a duty to monitor were virtually unchallengeable when a board was reasonably 
informed because courts presumed the board exercised good faith.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967–68.  
The Caremark court, however, changed this and found that decisions made with actual good faith are 
protected, but decisions that are not made with actual good faith will breach the duty of loyalty.  
Id. at 968–69. 
131. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.  This effectively subsumed the duty to monitor within the duty 
of loyalty.  Id. at 967.  It rationalized that “a demanding test of liability in the oversight context is 
probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a class, as it is in the board decision context, since it 
makes board service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith 
performance of duty by such directors.”  Id. at 971. 
132. Id. at 967–70. 
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mislead or disregard the interests of her investors—whether they are 
shareholders or clients.  Such protections see competency as vital to the legal 
profession; its limitation unreasonable and its breach inexcusable.133 
Accordingly, at least one court has recognized that the failure to submit 
a brief is grounds for sanction based on a violation of the duty of 
competency.134  In In re Mance,135 an attorney admitted to conduct that was 
in violation of the District of Columbia’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 
namely, “failure to provide competent representation[,]” “failure to serve a 
client with skill and care[,]” and “failure to provide zealous and diligent 
representation[,]” all of which stemmed from the failure of the attorney to 
file a brief.136  The attorney’s client filed a complaint with the Bar Counsel, 
but withdrew the complaint after entering into a written agreement in which 
the attorney agreed to pay a monetary sum to settle any differences with the 
client.137  Although the attorney only made one payment, the court did not 
find that the attorney’s behavior constituted “misappropriation, dishonesty, 
or intentional misconduct.”138  However, the court ruled that because the 
“sanction f[ell] within the range of discipline imposed for similar misconduct,” 
the application of the sanction was appropriate.139  The use of the word 
 
133. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2017) (“In all professional functions a lawyer should be competent, prompt and diligent.” (emphasis 
added)), and id. r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.” (emphasis added)), 
with id. r. 1.2(c) (“A lawyer may limit the scope of representation if the limitation is reasonable under 
the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”).  Further, protections for this notion of 
fairness are also present in criminal cases, in that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel was 
found to be a right to effective assistance of counsel; a lawyer may not limit her duties to her client in 
such a way that they limit her duty to provide effective assistance of counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  Similar to the duties in business organizations, the Supreme Court 
characterizes these duties as duties of loyalty.  Id.  To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a client 
must prove deficient performance, measured by “reasonableness under prevailing professional 
norms”—not the Model Rules.  See id.  (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar 
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only 
guides.” (emphasis added)).  If prevailing professional norms are based on the rules of the state bar 
association and/or the state supreme court, is this a synchronized calling for the presence of the 
element of fairness? 
134. See In re Mance, 748 S.E.2d 216, 217–19 (S.C. 2013) (per curiam) (establishing sanctions 
were warranted when an attorney admitted to misconduct, including “failure to provide competent 
representation[,]” “failure to serve a client with skill and care[,]” and “failure to provide zealous and 
diligent representation” stemming from attorney’s failure to submit a brief). 
135. In re Mance, 748 S.E.2d 216 (S.C. 2013) (per curiam). 
136. Id. at 217–18. 
137. Id. at 218. 
138. Id. at 219. 
139. Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Evans, 902 A.2d 56 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam)). 
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misconduct implies sanctions were appropriate because of an attorney’s 
breach of her ethical duties—failing to file a brief. 
True, failure to file a brief is not akin to writing a good brief, but Mance 
represents two key aspects in support of imposing ethical briefs: 1) there is 
a connection between ethical duties and the attorney’s conduct in brief 
writing; and 2) the bar of current brief writing standards is set too low—it 
is always in tune with a need to punish attorneys for misconduct.  
Incidentally, the current state has developed so that some brief writing 
mistakes are tangible,140 while others are relatively extinct.141  The latter 
are the not-so-obvious mistakes bringing havoc to our precedential system, 
and require judicial evaluation.142  Infusing ethical standards with current 
ones will raise the bar throughout, thereby fulfilling the purpose embodied 




140. For example, failing to submit briefs.  See In re Koenig, 959 N.Y.S.2d 158, 158–62 
(App. Div. 2013) (per curiam) (referring a three-month suspension when an attorney neglected to file 
briefs for nine separate immigration matters); see also In re James, 911 A.2d 409, 409–10 (D.C. 2006) 
(per curiam) (sentencing disbarment when an attorney failed to file a brief despite a court order 
compelling it); Mance, 748 S.E.2d at 218 (regulating an attorney’s misconduct in failing to file a brief).  
Other situations, like stating the trial facts correctly, should also be obvious.  See Am. Paging of Tex., 
Inc. v. El Paso Paging, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 237, 240–42 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) (justifying 
sanctions for a party whose brief asserted material misrepresentations of fact).  Without accurate 
statements of fact, the issues may be distorted.  See Lidia Stiglich & Zelalem Bogale, Writing to Judges . . . 
Persuasively, NEV. LAW., Oct. 2013, at 16, 17 (“Within each issue, decide which facts are relevant and 
use them to propel your analysis.  If certain facts are relevant to more than one issue, be sure to recast 
them (accurately) using greater or lesser detail to fit each issue.”). 
141. See In re Sobolevsky, 944 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (App. Div. 2012) (per curiam) (relaying 
suspension for attorney who submitted briefs of “shockingly poor quality”).  In In re Sobolevsky, the 
attorney’s brief was actually written by his paralegal and the attorney failed to review the brief before 
submission.  Id.  This did not come as a surprise to the court—the brief had “incorrect client 
names[,] . . . irrelevant boilerplate” language, and made “reference to evidence that had not been 
submitted.”  Id.  In situations like this, lawyers should know that “[a] lawyer is bound by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).  Further, “a lawyer having direct 
supervisory authority over [a] nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure” a non-lawyer acting 
on behalf of the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm provides “reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct 
is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”  Id. r. 5.3. 
142. See, e.g., State v. Mendenhall, Nos. 20146-5-III, 21160-6-III, 2003 WL 1901276, at *8 
(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2003) (concluding counsel’s brief was poorly written, but ultimately finding 
it acceptable).  Where courts accept a poorly written brief, it is after concluding there was no deficient 
performance.  Id. at *6. 
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
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C.    Defining the Scope of an Ethical Brief Standard Through Organization, 
Compression, and Revision 
Citing to a procedural rule to justify why a brief is inadequate does little 
to move the law forward; procedural reasoning requires little articulation, 
offering little explanation.  Lack of controlling authority or mention within 
the Model Rules constricts the definition of the ethical brief’s scope.  
Luckily, books, periodicals, and law review articles (“secondary sources”) 
offering advice on adequate brief writing are ever present144 and 
unwaveringly patient.145  Within these sources lies the best hope of 
completing the puzzle that is the “better brief.” 
Fundamentally, sources within secondary sources persistently align with 
the concerns of the Model Rules.  Recognizing the importance of zealous 
advocacy, judicial economy, and the health of the law, these are relevant and 
reliable146 sources.  Their authors, as advocates for better briefs,147 instill 
three components to brief writing: organization, clarity, and compression. 
1.    Organization148 
When organizing a brief, a lawyer is essentially organizing her many 
thoughts on the issues; developing the structure of her argument so that the 
 
144. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at xix (“Published advice on how to persuade judges 
is as old as the profession of judging itself.”).  “[S]ources include Aristotle, Isocrates, Demetrius, Cicero, 
and Quintilian.”  Id. 
145. See id. (“So anything fundamentally new contributed by [a] small volume would probably 
be wrong.”). 
146. Federal Rules of Evidence require an expert witness to be qualified.  FED. R. EVID. 702.  
The foundation must be reliable, and the testimony itself helpful—i.e., connected to the issues in 
question.  Id.  The Texas Supreme Court made this determination by evaluating six factors: 
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; 
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the 
expert; 
(3) whether [or not] the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 
(4) the technique’s potential rate of error; 
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the 
relevant scientific community; and 
(6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995). 
147. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 83 (manifesting advice on how to persuade judges); 
see also Duncan, supra note 2, at 1101–36 (portraying—from a judge’s perspective—several ways in 
which briefs can be improved to be more helpful to judges). 
148. Knowing how to use and arrange the parts of a brief.  Namely, your structure.  SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 82. 
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reader can determine the exact method to her madness.149  If a lawyer 
organizes her thoughts in a way that proceeds logically towards a conclusion, 
it might help convince a judge that the law logically follows suit. 
This type of organizational structure is a game of strategy.150  It can be 
done similarly to outlining in law school—“[b]egin with the big picture and, 
before you write, try to articulate the distilled version orally in language that 
a non-lawyer could understand.  Then, break up the brief by stating the 
issues and carry it out in stages, issue by issue.”151  As an alternative, a 
lawyer can dictate issues based on the specific facts in question, and their 
relevance to her argument.152 
Whichever way a lawyer chooses to arrange her brief, some sort of 
organization is imperative.153  It keeps her thoughts separate, and helps her 
to understand the issues in relation to the rest of the brief—preventing her 
from getting off topic and running into illogical territory.154 
2.    Compression 
“A judge who realizes that a brief is wordy will skim it; one who finds a 
brief terse and concise will read every word.”155  Compression means 
resolving to not use words that do not add something to a brief; 
“[e]liminating those sentences, phrases, and words that do no work.”156  In 
 
149. See Lewis, supra note 24, at 1011 (“Facts should be organized in a manner that rings out a 
clear theme without your having to spell the theme out.”). 
150. But cf. id. (“All the careful strategy in the world will be of no assistance to you unless you 
write clearly and forcefully.” (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, Appellate Advocacy in the Federal Courts, 
79 F.R.D. 165, 169 (1978))). 
151. Stiglich & Bogale, supra note 140, at 16–17.  “If this reminds you of outlining in law school, 
it’s not a coincidence.”  Id. 
152. See id. (“Within each issue, decide which facts are relevant and use them to propel your 
analysis.”). 
153. In almost every source attempting to facilitate adequate brief writing, organization is always 
a factor.  See id. (detailing ways to organize a brief); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 83 (construing 
how important it is to know how to use and arrange the parts of a brief, for example, “[p]lac[ing] right 
up front what you want the judges to resolve”); Duncan, supra note 2, at 114 (“Having a structure helps 
beat a bout of writer’s block . . . .”).  Cf. Douglas Abrams, 10 Tips for Effective Brief Writing, WIS. LAW., 
Feb. 2015, at 14, 16 (relaying focus on “quality” instead of organization). 
154. See Lewis, supra note 24, at 1011 (“Organization is key.”).  It can help with researching 
because you can easily find yourself outside the scope of your brief when researching a particular idea 
if you cannot determine where, within the organizational structure of your brief, the idea would fit in.  
See id. (“Keep your focus on a spirit of justice.  You must convince the appellate judges early on that 
ruling in favor of your client would be just, and to rule against her would be unjust.” (citing MYRON 
MOSKOVITZ, WINNING AN APPEAL 21 (4th ed. 2007))). 
155.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 81. 
156. Id. 
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other words, “strive for economy in your language and you will produce a 
hard-hitting brief.”157 
To compress means to be brief.  It is one thing to take many pages to 
effectively cover a complicated topic,158 while it is entirely another to 
continuously repeat information supporting your argument once it 
effectively stands.159  Repeating even support material becomes, well, 
repetitive, and, “[r]epetition bores, and boredom invites skimming.”160  
Concerning string cites: there is no need to continuously assert your point 
by citing to multiple cases if merely one will suffice.161 
A brief writer should also compress the number of issues she raises; 
keeping in mind that raising many issues is advocating, but not necessarily 
zealously.  The fewer issues she chooses, the more thought she gives to each 
one.162 
3.    Revision 
Revision most concerns professionalism; a lawyer may be diligent in 
organizing and compressing her brief, yet her work is not professionally fit 
until she reviews and revises—assuring competence. 
Writing ideas out on paper helps;163 “[m]ore often than not, the act of 
writing a brief will actually change how you think about your case.”164  
 
157. Stiglich & Bogale, supra note 140, at 17. 
158. Contra Aaron P. v. Hawaii, Dep’t of Educ., Civ. Nos. 11-00635 ACK-RLP, 11-00711 
ACK-RLP., 2013 WL 4791444, at *4 (D. Haw. Sept. 5, 2013) (asserting a motion for attorneys’ fees 
was poorly drafted because it was 48 pages long and still failed to clearly ask for a calculated attorneys’ 
fee). 
159. See Abrams, supra note 153, at 16 (“‘I have yet to put down a brief,’ reports Chief Justice 
John G. Roberts, Jr., ‘and say, “I wish that had been longer. . . .”  Almost every brief I’ve read could 
be shorter.’” (quoting Interviews with United States Supreme Court Justices: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., 
13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 5, 35 (2010))).  Particularly, concerning a brief’s preliminary statement, 
“[w]hatever you do, don’t allow this section to duplicate what is written elsewhere.”  SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 3, at 92. 
160.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 92. 
161. See id. at 99 (“Brevity means abandoning string cites with more than three cases.”).  That 
being said, “[i]f you’re dueling with opposing counsel about what constitutes ‘the weight of authority,’ 
put all your cases in a footnote.”  Id. 
162. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 1114 (asserting outline formats can help discover “the deep 
issues in a case” when focusing on three of your best issues). 
163. I stress that “[a]t least one set of edits should be made on the printed page, pen in hand.”  
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 80. 
164. Stiglich & Bogale, supra note 140, at 18.  “Once written, you may think it better to lead 
your analysis of a complex issue with a conclusion rather than an issue statement and the legal 
principles.”  Id.  “Or, you may discover the facts of your case need to be rearranged or told with more 
detail to harness their persuasive force.”  Id. 
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“Seeing your arguments on paper tends to give them more definition,” and 
therefore, “[r]evisiting your brief once it is written will ensure you are saying 
exactly what you mean to say.”165 
Because saying exactly what you mean invokes clarity, revision denotes a 
special focus on clarity.166  If a brief must be clear to be understood, then 
a brief must be clear to be competent.  Thus, competency requires an effort 
to review what you have written and ask yourself: could this be “put more 
clearly, more vividly, more crisply?”167 
VII.    CONCLUSION168 
In light of the evidence, it is no coincidence that the core purposes of the 
Model Rules and the sources aiding better briefs are in agreement.  Because 
our ethical obligations as lawyers are deemed necessary to the practice of 
law, so should our obligations to be better brief writers.169  May it please 




166. See id. (“Clarity speaks for itself.  It requires no introduction or assurances.”).  That being 
said, one nuance of clarity is not so intuitive: “[s]imply stating that something is ‘clear’ does not make 
it so.”  Id.  “Don’t detract from your narrative or analysis by stating that something is ‘clear.’”  Id.  
“State it declaratively and provide authority for the proposition, then move on.”  Id.  “In his first play, 
‘Oedipus,’ Voltaire writes, ‘Virtue debases in justifying itself.’”  Id. 
167.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 3, at 81.  See Coleman, supra note 81, at 1083 (“State the 
issues early, clearly, accurately, and concisely.”). 
168. “A conclusion specifying with particularity the relief the party seeks.”  SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 3, at 100 (citing SUP. CT. R. 24(1)(j)).  Issues “should be articulated in a manner that tends 
to pull the court toward your conclusion.”  Coleman, supra note 81, at 1083. 
169. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) 
(favoring a “special responsibility for the quality of justice”). 
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